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Abstract 
This paper assesses the impact on the Italian economy of Italy withdrawing from 
the euro area by means of the stochastic simulation of a macroeconometric model. 
The model considers the effect of devaluation on output, sovereign debt valuation, 
and the development of bilateral economic relations between Italy and its major 
trade partners. The simulation results are consistent with the findings of recent 
applied research: the Italian economy would follow the V-shaped pattern observed 
in most currency crises. After an initial period of stress, and provided an 
appropriate set of countercyclical policy measures is implemented, real GDP would 
recover and resume growth at a reasonable pace. In particular, while the expected 
positive impact of nominal exchange rate realignment on external balance would 
be transitory, higher nominal growth would bring about a persistent reduction in 
unemployment and the public debt-to-GDP ratio. These results are robust to a set 
of sensitivity checks, considering a number of adverse circumstances such as 
exchange rate overshooting, financial panic, supply-side constraints, and the 
application of retaliatory tariffs. 
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The economic performance of the euro area (EA) has so far been disappointing. Eurostat 
(2017) reports that from 1999 to 2015 real annual growth averaged 1.3% in the EA12 
countries, and 2.3% in the other European Union (EU) countries. Dreyer and Schmid 
(2016) show that while EU membership has had a positive impact on growth, membership 
in the EA has no additional effect on growth, except during economic crises, when it 
affects growth negatively. Average growth in the EA has been 0.2% since 2008, while 
the other EU countries have achieved a real growth rate of 1.3%. These outcomes are 
consistent with the findings of Bohl et al. (2016) that exchange rate regimes and financial 
crises interact in a way that makes recovery harder under pegged exchange rates, of which 
a monetary union is the most extreme case. 
The difficulty experienced by a currency union in coping with external shocks in the 
absence of a federal government is a standard prediction of optimum currency area (OCA) 
theory (Krugman, 2013). As a consequence, the persistence of the EA crisis is shedding 
new light on the long-standing debate between scholars who have advocated the need to 
build a political union before adopting a single currency in order to make the latter 
sustainable (Meade, 1957; Kaldor, 1971), and those who have claimed that the single 
currency would become endogenously sustainable without any need for major 
institutional changes before its adoption (Scitovsky, 1958; Frankel and Rose, 1997). A 
growing body of evidence supports the hypothesis that the single currency has fostered 
divergence among its member countries, thus leading to the underperformance of the EA 
and undermining its resilience to external shocks. This has happened in different ways. 
Economic and financial integration has encouraged the exploitation of EMU member’s 
comparative advantages, as anticipated by Krugman (1993) and confirmed by Caporale 
et al. (2015), increasing the occurrence of idiosyncratic shocks, and hence making a one-
size-fits-all monetary policy unsuitable. Rafiq and Mallick (2008) argue that since the 
response to monetary policy in the three largest EA countries is not homogenous, a 
common monetary policy may amplify misalignment of national business cycles. This 
asymmetry is confirmed by, among others, Barigozzi et al. (2013), while van Ewijk and 
Arnold (2015) stress the pro-cyclical role of financial integration on member countries’ 





of Granville and Hussain (2017), who demonstrate that adoption of the euro has actually 
lowered the concordance among member countries’ business cycles. 
Another finding of recent research is that monetary union has not only affected business 
cycle synchronization, but also trend productivity, because the fall in real interest rates 
has caused allocative distortions that have undermined labour productivity in weaker 
countries (Gopinath et al., 2015, Cette et al., 2016). On the other hand, the windfall of 
low interest payments provided perverse fiscal policy incentives that undermined 
sovereign debt sustainability in peripheral countries, as anticipated among others by 
Feldstein (2005) and confirmed by Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2013) and Ciżkowicz et 
al. (2015). At the same time, since in a monetary union “the task of adjusting for 
competitiveness and relative prices” is transferred to the labour market (Dornbusch, 
1996), the single currency tends to deny its users the benefits of a larger common market. 
The reason for this is that the cushion against external shocks afforded by the common 
market is impaired by the pro-cyclical effect of internal devaluation policies, as argued 
among others by Bofinger (2015). The deflationary bias of these policies, highlighted by 
Krugman (1998), has had a negative effect on the banking systems of several peripheral 
EA countries, contributing to an alarming increase in non-performing loans (Notarpietro 
and Rodano, 2016).4 
The idea that the single currency could come to an end is creeping into the debate: euro-
sceptic political parties are gaining momentum in EA member countries5 and can provoke 
mainstream parties to be less supportive of European integration (Meijers, 2015); the 
flaws of the EMU were cited by Brexit advocates in their successful campaign to persuade 
a majority (51.9 percent) of voters in the United Kingdom to support their cause in the 
EU membership referendum that took place on 23 June 2016; the largest EU countries 
that do not yet belong to the EA and did not negotiate an opt-out clause, as the United 
Kingdom and Denmark did, are postponing their entry into the ERM-II mechanism (a 
prerequisite for joining the euro).6 
 
4
 Italy has experienced one of the most severe banking sector crises: non-performing loans to total gross loans reached 18 percent 
2015 compared to 7 percent in 2006 (source: World Bank http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FB.AST.NPER.ZS). 
5
 See, e.g., The Economist (2015), or the special issue of the International Political Science Review (vol 36, issue 3, June 2015) 
recently devoted to the analysis of the rise of critical positions towards the euro: “Euroscepticism, from the margins to the mainstream”. 
6






Consequently, several scholars who regard European political integration as a sensible 
goal have now come to regard the adoption of the single currency as having delayed, 
rather than accelerated, the achievement of that goal (Zielonka, 2014; Majone, 2014), as 
foreseen by Kaldor (1971). At the same time, as recently argued by Stiglitz (2016), in the 
absence of a political union (as advocated by the “Five presidents’ report”; Juncker et al., 
2015), or at least of a coordinated policy response, there is a possibility of the single 
currency collapsing, an event that would generate systemic uncertainty at the political and 
institutional level. 
Against this backdrop, an analysis of the macroeconomic impact of such an event 
becomes increasingly relevant. We contribute to such an analysis by developing a set of 
stochastic simulations of an annual structural macroeconometric model to assess the 
macroeconomic consequences of a withdrawal of Italy from the EA. We focus on Italy 
because the weakness of its banking system makes it extremely vulnerable to financial 
shocks, and because, since Italy is the third largest country in the EA, its withdrawal could 
precipitate an overall collapse of the single currency.7 In assessing the macroeconomic 
stress caused by withdrawal, we identify the following four channels of potential 
uncertainty: first, our model disaggregates the trade relations of Italy among seven partner 
areas, allowing us to distinguish between realignments of the new Italian currency with 
respect to the currencies of its main trading partners, estimated using the behavioural 
equilibrium exchange rate (BEER) approach of Clark and McDonald (1998); second, the 
sovereign debt spread is endogenised by relating it to macroeconomic fundamentals 
according to Gödl and Kleinert’s (2016) approach; third, the model considers the possible 
contractionary effects arising from the balance sheet effects of a large devaluation 
(Krugman and Taylor, 1978), i.e. the real consequences of the financial stress that some 
categories of agents would incur because of their exposures in foreign currencies 
regulated by contracts under foreign law; finally, the simulations control for the 
possibility of a banking crisis by drawing on the results of Céspedes (2005). 
 
7
 Most empirical studies devoted to analysing the effects of a withdrawal from the euro concern a much smaller country, Greece, 
whose withdrawal would not necessarily endanger the overall existence of the single currency (Kasimati and Veraros, 2013; 





The next section describes the model used in the scenario analyses. Section 3 describes 
the counterfactual scenarios. Section 4 presents the simulation results. Section 5 is 
devoted to sensitivity analyses. In Section 6, we formulate some concluding remarks. 
2. The model 
The scenario analysis is carried out with a medium-sized structural econometric model of 
the Italian economy. Structural models are often used to assess the macroeconomic 
consequences of major institutional changes (see e.g. Pain and Young, 2004; Baker et al., 
2016; Ebell et al., 2016). As with every econometric methodology, they have strengths 
and weaknesses as shown for instance by Bacchini et al. (2013). However, as far as the 
EMU is concerned, the main criticism of the structural approach, namely, its potential 
vulnerability to Lucas’s (1976) critique, was found to be empirically irrelevant by Smith 
(2009). Granger and Newbold’s (1974) criticism that estimated structural equations may 
reflect spurious correlations can be dealt with by using cointegration techniques, as we 
have done in estimating our equations. Finally, another major criticism, Sims’s (1980) 
claim that structural models impose “incredible” overidentifying restrictions, must be 
gauged against the fact that the VAR approach, proposed to overcome this potential 
shortcoming, can be applied to a relatively limited set of variables, and as a consequence 
does not allow the researcher to design detailed scenarios. This may explain why central 
banks of EA member countries rely on structural models (among others) for forecasting 
and policy analysis (Fagan and Morgan, 2005).  
 
[ Insert Table 1 around here ] 
 
Table 1 summarizes the model’s structure (a complete description of the model’s 
equations, data sources, estimates, and simulation properties is provided by Bagnai and 
Mongeau Ospina, 2014). The model adopts the AS/AD framework as in the case of 
models of comparable size (Welfe, 2013): potential output is defined using Cobb-Douglas 
technology with labour-augmenting technical progress (Eq. [8]); labour demand follows 
from the same technology (Eq. [9]); capital accumulation is a function of the gap between 
marginal productivity and user cost of capital (Eq. [10]); aggregate demand is modelled 





(Eq. [19]) and on interest rates according to the Taylor rule (Eq. [25]), keeping the model 
on its long-run growth path. Although national reaction functions such as the Taylor rule 
are inconsistent with the EA monetary policy implementation, some models run by EA 
national central banks use national Taylor rules for running counterfactual analyses 
(Fagan and Morgan, 2005, p. 13). The two other solutions adopted by national models, 
namely taking interest rates as exogenous, or specifying an area-wide reaction function, 
are ruled out by the design of our experiments. Indeed, considering the interest rate as 
exogenous would prevent us from examining its evolution in the counterfactual scenarios. 
Moreover, the withdrawal of Italy would be likely to precipitate the end of the single 
currency, in which case an area-wide reaction function would become meaningless. 
Equations are estimated in error correction form using annual data from 1960 to 2013. 
Long-run relations allow for the possibility of structural breaks at unknown dates 
(Gregory and Hansen, 1996; Hatemi-J, 2008). Interestingly enough, about a half of the 
structural breaks in the long-run parameters occur in the Nineties, and six of them, 
including a fall in the rate of labour augmenting technical progress, in the run-up to the 
launch of the euro between 1996 and 1999. Estimates of the long-run equations are 
reported in Appendix 1 along with the cointegration test statistics.8  
The structure of its trade block makes the model particularly suitable for the simulations 
undertaken in this study: Eq. [13] and [14] disaggregate import and export flows among 
Italy’s seven main trade partner areas (EA core, EA periphery, United States, other 
European countries, OPEC, BRIC, and rest of the world). Disaggregation of the EA into 
a “core” and a “periphery” follows the findings of Busetti et al. (2007), according to 
which the EA is split into three “inflation clubs”: the low-inflation countries (Austria, 
Belgium, France, Finland and Germany), the high-inflation countries (Greece, Ireland, 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain), and a medium-inflation country, Italy. In the light of 
subsequent developments of its inflation rate, we moved the Netherlands to the low 
inflation club (i.e. to the EA core).  
These bilateral trade flows depend on a set of bilateral real exchange rates, RERi, 
defined by Eq. [16] as the ratio of domestic export prices Px (expressed in foreign 
currency using a suitable nominal exchange rate index Ei) to the i-th partner’s export 
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prices Pxi (taken as a proxy for the price of Italian imports from the i-th partner). This 
makes it possible to assess the consequences for Italy of leaving the EA by differentiating 
the realignments of the new national currency according to partner area. 
Additional features incorporated in the present version of the model concern the 
response of the other countries’ output, the pattern of government debt spreads and the 
possible negative effects of a large devaluation on balance sheets. 
Eq. [15] defines a set of dynamic equations, which express the rate of real growth of 
partner i = 1, …, 7 as a function of the rate of change of the bilateral real exchange rate 
and of the real growth rate of Italy. These equations provide a parsimonious and data-
congruent representation of partners’ growth dynamic response to a shock to the Italian 
economy, taking both price and quantity effects into account.  
Several studies have analysed the behaviour of sovereign bond yield spreads by 
focusing on the role of fundamental variables (Cimadomo et al., 2016), market sentiment 
and contagion (Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero, 2016), and expectations of a EA 
breakup (Canofari et al. 2015). Drawing on Gödl and Kleinert (2016), Eq. [26] expresses 
the government bond spread as a function of three fundamental variables related to public 
debt sustainability: the real rate of growth ( ), the public debt-to-GDP ratio D/Y (defined 
by Eq. [38]) and the government budget’s primary balance-to-GDP ratio (PB/Y). In 
particular, we use the parameters drawn from Gödl and Kleinert (2016; Table 1, 
“Eurozone crisis country” column). 
Since the seminal paper by Krugman and Taylor (1978), it is known that large 
devaluations may have a nonlinear impact: assuming that the Marshall-Lerner condition 
is met, once devaluation passes a given threshold, the positive effect of trade on growth 
is more than offset by the negative supply-side effects determined by the financial distress 
of domestic agents indebted in foreign currency or in contracts regulated by foreign law 
(see Kearns and Patel, 2016, for an updated survey and recent evidence). Since our model 
does not feature a detailed specification of private sector financial accounts, we allowed 
for possible contractionary balance-sheet effects by supplementing the model with a 












where  is the estimated loss in real output growth,  the variation in bilateral 
real exchange rate towards the EA core, edt the external debt-to-GDP ratio, ost the 
measure of “original sin” of Eichengreen et al. (2003) (i.e. the ratio of foreign liabilities 
issued in foreign currency to total foreign liabilities), Ibank a dummy variable that takes 
value 1 if a banking crisis occurs in the year before the devaluation, and 1 and 2 
estimated coefficients.  
Equation (1) feeds back into the definition of real GDP, thus affecting the overall 
model response to an exchange rate realignment. Several features of Equation (1) are 
worth noting. 
Firstly, Céspedes (2005) provides various estimates of the interaction parameter 1, 
ranging from 0.09 to 0.20. We chose the estimate provided in his Table 8, equal to 0.183, 
because it accommodates the possibility of a banking crisis, an event which is likely to 
take place in Italy before any decision about EA membership is made. According to 
Céspedes’s estimates, 2 = −0.014, which implies that if devaluation occurs after a 
banking crisis, another 1.4 points need to be subtracted from the real rate of growth. 
Secondly, in the case of Italy, the “original sin” variable refers to foreign exposures in 
euros governed by foreign law, which in the event of dismantling of the single currency 
would not be redenominated in the new national currency under the Lex monetae principle 
(Proctor, 2010). The aggregate size of these exposures was estimated by Nordvig (2014), 
whose method involves two steps: in the first step, aggregate external liabilities are 
divided into those that are under local or foreign law by legal definition. Liabilities under 
foreign law by legal definition include Bank of Italy Target 2 balances, whose nature is 
the object of an ongoing debate initiated by Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2012). In the 
second step, the proportion of liabilities under foreign law in the other categories 
(basically sovereign and private bonds) is estimated using microdata on bond issues. In 
Italy euro-denominated bonds (under both foreign and local law) account for about 95 
percent of the outstanding stock. The minor share of USD denominated bonds explains 
why the large devaluation of the euro by about 30 percent against the USD between 2014 
and 2015 did not cause any significant balance sheet effects. Hence, the exchange rate 
realignment likely to trigger contractionary balance sheet effects is that with respect to 









real rate towards the EA core, rather than the (average) real effective exchange rate, that 
would underestimate the potential balance sheet stress. In Italy, sovereign bonds account 
for about 66 percent of total euro-denominated issues, but only a small share of them (5 
percent) is regulated by foreign law. Considering non-euro denominated sovereign bonds 
as well, which on the contrary are mostly under foreign law, the share of sovereign bonds 
under foreign law is 7 percent (against an EA average of 9 percent). On the other hand, 
the share of private bonds under foreign law is 53 percent. Putting these numbers together 
gives an overall proportion of 24 percent of sovereign and private bond contracts being 
governed by foreign law. By adding loan-related liabilities to this, Nordvig obtains 
relevant gross external liabilities for the Italian economy (the edtost variable) equal to 
49 percent of GDP (Nordvig, 2014, Appendix B). While this value is the lowest of all EA 
countries, except Germany, according to Céspedes (2005, Table 9) it could be large 
enough to cause a contractionary effect. A more recent assessment of the redenomination 
risk for the Italian economy, carried out by Durand and Villemot (2016), that considers 
net (rather than gross) foreign exposures under foreign law, by taking into account also 
the asset side of the different institutional sectors, concludes that this risk is virtually 
absent. We prefer, however, to adopt the more conservative methodology proposed by 
Nordvig (2014), which focuses on gross foreign liabilities, because even in cases where 
foreign liabilities are matched by foreign assets at the macroeconomic level, and hence 
the net international investment position of a country, or of a country’s sector, is relatively 
reassuring, there may still be relevant mismatches in the balance sheets of individual 
agents (households, firms, government agencies), which could bring them to default.  
3. Counterfactual scenarios and simulation methodology 
The first major consequence of withdrawal from a monetary union would be realignment 
of the new national currency. According to the “general relativity” approach developed 
by Coakley et al. (2005), as well as to the literature on exchange rate forecasting (Lee et 
al., 2011), this realignment would be expected to compensate for the accumulated loss of 
competitiveness since the adoption of the euro. Both the expansionary consequences 
(through trade) and contractionary impacts (through balance sheet effects) of the 





A reliable estimate of the realignment is therefore crucial for setting up the simulation 
scenarios. 
There is now a large body of literature on real effective exchange rate (REER) 
misalignments in the EA (Salto and Turrini, 2010). Different approaches provide broadly 
consistent results. In particular, they indicate an appreciation of the “Italian euro” (to 
paraphrase a term used by Jeong et al., 2010) in real effective terms, ranging from 4 
percent (Jeong et al., 2010) to 7 percent (Coudert et al., 2013). However, these estimates 
refer to the real effective exchange rate, while the model features bilateral exchange rates 
for each of the seven trade partner areas considered. The new Italian currency is unlikely 
to experience equal realignments towards each partner area: in other words, the expected 
depreciation in real effective terms could emerge as the net result of appreciations and 
depreciations in bilateral terms. In order to define a set of bilateral realignments 
consistent with model structure, as well as with economic theory and the available 
evidence, we followed Coudert et al. (2013) in applying Clark and McDonald’s (1998) 
BEER approach to our database. For this purpose, the standard equation of the 
equilibrium real effective exchange rate was reformulated as follows: 
 (2) 
where RERi,t is the i-th area-specific real exchange rate defined by Eq. [16] in Table 1, 
PRODi,t is Italian average productivity relative to area i, calculated as the ratio of the 
index of Italian labour productivity to the GDP-weighted average of the productivity 
indices in area i, NFLi,t is the GDP-weighted average of the net foreign liabilities to GDP 
ratio in partner area i (taken as a proxy for Italy’s bilateral net financial assets in relation 
to area i), and i is a country-specific fixed effect. The equation was then estimated using 
the DOLS cointegrating panel estimator on the four major trade partner areas (the core 
and periphery of the EA, the United States and other European countries, jointly 
accounting on average for about 65 percent of Italian trade), considering annual data 
ranging from 1970 to 1998, and the area-specific RERi,t equilibrium values were 
forecasted over the sample 1999-2013 and compared with actual values in order to 
estimate the average misalignment since the onset of the euro.9 
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 Estimation results are available upon request. 





The estimated average misalignments, used in our counterfactual scenario, are as 
follows: 
• 24 percent overvaluation with respect to the EA core; 
• 28 percent undervaluation with respect to the EA periphery; 
• 8 percent overvaluation with respect to other European countries; 
• 12 percent overvaluation with respect to the US dollar. 
In order to check the plausibility of these estimates, we expressed them in effective 
terms by weighting them with the respective trade shares. The effective misalignment is 
an overvaluation by nearly 11 percent, an order of magnitude consistent with previous 
findings mentioned above, although rather on the high side especially in view of more 
recent studies. El Shagi et al., (2016) confirm that the euro is overvalued for Italy but find 
the misalignment to be negligible in effective terms (2.35 percent) while Durand and 
Villemot (2016) estimate that the euro is actually undervalued in real effective terms for 
Italy. We prefer however to consider more prudential scenarios where the Italian currency 
would depreciate against the core of the EA.  
In our scenarios we apply to the pattern of the adjustment the same prudential attitude 
that we apply to its size, by assuming that in the first year the new Italian currency would 
move to compensate immediately for the misalignments, bringing the area-specific real 
exchange rates into line with their respective equilibrium vales. This pattern contrasts 
with the historical experience of the most recent European currency crises, where the 
adjustment has occurred over two years gradually, or with a very moderate degree of 
overshooting (see e.g. Kim and Kim, 2007). We also test the sensitivity of the results with 
respect to two alternative patterns of realignment, the first one, more consistent with the 
historical evidence, featuring a gradual adjustment, and the second one featuring a 
sizeable overshooting. We assume that nominal realignments towards the three remaining 
blocks (OPEC, BRIC and ROW) will be of the same size as realignment towards the 
USD. Even this is a rather conservative assumption, because owing to the large 
devaluation carried out by the ECB between 2014 and 2015 it is unlikely that the major 
emerging countries would allow a “euro legacy” currency to fall any further. Finally, it is 





actually investigating the macroeconomic consequences of a dissolution of the single 
currency.10 
Summing up, the realignment is implemented by decreasing E1 by 24 percent, E3, E5, 
E6 and E7 by 12 percent, E4 by 8 percent, and by increasing E2 by 28 percent in Eq. [16]. 
Again, we will test the sensitivity of the results by allowing the two alternative patterns 
of realignment (i.e., gradual and overshooting) to be applied only to the core and to all 
partners. 
The bilateral realignments are analysed by implementing two scenarios: 
1. base case scenario, where we take into account a banking crisis occurring in the 
year preceding dismantling of the single currency, thus setting Ibank = 1 in Eq. 
(1); 
2. countercyclical policy scenario, with respect to the previous scenario we 
introduce a possible set of countercyclical policy measures to counteract the 
possible recessionary impact of devaluation, exploiting the fiscal space opened 
by nominal realignment. The policy mix is defined as: 
a) a one percentage point increase in government employment, ng, each 
year, reaching 5 percent above baseline in the last year of the simulation 
horizon; 
b) a permanent increase in nominal government investment, Ig, equal to 5 
percent of the baseline value; 
c) a 5 percent increase in government wage rate, Wg, above the baseline. 
The size of the countercyclical policies is such as to bring the affected variables back 
to their pre-crisis trends (for instance, by offsetting the impact of public sector wage 
freezes). 
The scenarios were assessed against the medium-run out-of-sample baseline 
projections of the model, constructed using the IMF’s (2014) global macroeconomic 
scenario as reference point. All simulations were stochastic and 10,000 replications with 
bootstrapped innovations were carried out for each scenario. The impacts were estimated 
as averages of the replications, and each estimate is accompanied by its standard error. 
 
10
 The model’s structure allows investigating also “two-speed euro” scenarios by considering a realignment of the Italian currency 





4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Base case scenario 
Table 2 and the first column of Figure 1 summarize the evolution of the Italian economy 
following the currency realignment described in the previous section. The results are 
presented as percentage deviations from baseline for flow or index variables, and as 
absolute deviations for rates of change and ratios to GDP. Here we only comment on the 
main features of the scenarios, by assessing their consistency with respect to the relevant 
empirical literature.11 
 
[ Insert Table 2 around here ] 
 
Despite a significant boost to the trade balance (which would improve by 1.6 percent 
of GDP in the first year), our simulation confirms Céspedes’s (2005) finding that a 
devaluation has short-run contractionary effects in countries whose relevant exposure 
exceeds 35 percent of GDP, like Italy: owing to balance sheets effects, in the first year of 
the simulation real GDP growth falls 0.7 points below the baseline. The pattern in the 
following years confirms the results of Teimouri and Brooks (2015), according to which 
real GDP follows a “V-shaped” pattern after a large devaluation: the fall in real GDP 
continues in the second year, but is then followed by a recovery that brings GDP above 
the baseline by 1.4 percent in the fifth year after the realignment. It is worth noting, 
however, that while the recessionary impact is statistically significant in the first two 
years, over time dispersion of the simulation outcomes increases. In other words, while 
the short-run recession is statistically significant, medium-run recovery is not, much as in 
Figure 3 of Teimouri and Brooks (2015). This pattern is apparent in the top-left graph of 
Figure 1. 
 









The impact on inflation is significant but not devastating (in the first year consumer 
price inflation rises 2.9 points above baseline), confirming a well-known stylized fact 
(Burstein et al., 2002). This increase affects nominal growth, with a number of 
consequences. Firstly, the public debt-to-GDP ratio falls by 5.2 percent of GDP, a result 
consistent with the debt accumulation equation (Eq. [38] in Table 1). Indeed, since the 
public debt-to-GDP ratio at the beginning of the simulation horizon is close to 133 
percent, a 3.7-point increase in nominal GDP growth, ceteris paribus, brings about a 
decrease in D/Y by 4.9 percentage points of GDP. This positive evolution is favoured by 
the response of the real interest rate: nominal interest rates increase less than the inflation 
rate, bringing about a fall in the real interest rate. It is worth noting that a similar pattern 
emerges as a stylized fact in empirical analyses using annual data (Nitsch, 2004), where 
the inflationary consequences of a breakup are usually larger and more statistically 
significant than the increase in the interest rate spread. Moreover, Italy has historically 
the third largest government balance primary surplus in the EA, with an average of 1.6 
percent of GDP from 1999 to 2016. This should allow the Italian government to restore 
market confidence relatively quickly. The fall in real interest rates, as well as the boost to 
foreign demand, bring about an increase in investment growth by 1 percentage point 
above the baseline. However, the rise in inflation has an adverse impact on real wages 
that fall by -1.7 percent below their baseline value, with a negative effect on consumption. 
This shock is progressively absorbed starting in the second year, and at the end of the 
simulation horizon real wages are 2.3 percent above the baseline, while unemployment is 
-0.4 points below the baseline.  
4.2 Countercyclical policy scenario 
Since Italy is currently running a current account surplus, after examining the previous 
scenario one may wonder whether it would be worthwhile trading a significant increase 
in the trade balance for an uncertain increase in real GDP.12 Yet, contrary to what 
happened after the 1992 EMS crisis, in 2011 the current account balance adjustment was 
achieved mostly on the imports side, by repressing domestic demand through internal 
devaluation policies. This implies that while an uncoordinated reversal of such policies 
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would again compromise external equilibrium, a nominal realignment would provide 
some fiscal space, by allowing expansionary budget policies to be carried out without 
compromising external equilibrium. The scenario depicted in Table 3 explores this 
hypothesis by assessing the consequences on the withdrawal scenario of a partial undoing 
of some austerity policies implemented in the last decade, from public wages freeze to 
cuts in public investment.  
 
[ Insert Table 3 around here ] 
 
The progressive implementation of expansionary budget policies brings about a steady 
increase in the public deficit-to-GDP ratio, up to one point in the fourth year of the 
simulation. However, this adverse outcome does not compromise public debt 
sustainability because the measures considered are able to offset the contractionary 
impacts of devaluation. Contrary to what happens in the base case scenario, in the first 
two years of the simulation there is no significant drop in real GDP, while starting in the 
third year, GDP rises significantly above baseline. The unemployment rate decreases 
immediately by 0.7 points, and falls progressively by 1.8 points towards the end of the 
simulation sample. The higher rate of real growth compared with the previous scenario 
dampens the initial fall in imports. Consequently, the impact of realignment on the trade 
balance-to-GDP ratio is reduced by almost half (from 1.6 in the previous scenario to 0.9 
percentage points), and at the end of the simulation the external balance posts a negative, 
though not statistically significant, deviation from the baseline. However, along with this 
adverse effect on external equilibrium, which is not particularly worrying given the 
current situation of current account surplus, the higher growth has a positive impact on 
the public debt-to-GDP ratio, that experiences a sharper decrease (-7.0 percentage points) 
because expansionary policies bring about a larger increase in nominal growth (5.2 points 
above baseline in the first period). This result may seem counterintuitive, yet it is 
consistent with recent research and historical evidence. For instance, using a model with 
state-dependent financial frictions, Canzoneri et al. (2016) show that fiscal multipliers in 
depressed economies may be larger than two, though much smaller during expansions. 





about an increase in the public debt-to-GDP ratio of about 16 points in three years, and 
supports the idea that reversing those policies could actually foster fiscal consolidation.  
The expansionary policy stance brings about a higher inflationary impact, with 
consumer price inflation 3.7 points above baseline in the first year. However, owing to 
the termination of the public wage freeze, the adverse impact on the real wage is smaller 
than in the previous scenario, and at the end of the simulation real wages are 3.6 
percentage points above the baseline. At the end of the simulation horizon, the inflation 
rate is 1.4 points above the baseline, and the unemployment rate 1.8 points below. 
Moreover, the increase in public investment boosts aggregate investment, which at the 
end of the simulation is 8 percentage points above the baseline, with an improvement of 
2.5 percentage points in the investment-to-GDP ratio, which partially offsets the 5-point 
fall experienced since the onset of the global crisis. 
5. Sensitivity analyses 
Although the stochastic simulation method accounts for a major source of uncertainty 
(the equations’ random shocks), it cannot account fully for the systemic and political 
uncertainty that a withdrawal scenario is likely to trigger. For instance, the pattern of the 
exchange rate realignment, as well as the extent of financial panic, will be heavily affected 
by the relations among central banks, and the effectiveness of the realignment could be 
impaired by the adoption of retaliatory tariffs. Moreover, since the estimation sample ends 
in 2013, the estimated parameters could not reflect fully the consequences of the ongoing 
deindustrialization and banking crisis in the Italian economy. These could translate in a 
slower reaction to the exchange rate adjustment (due to supply-side bottlenecks), and in 
larger balance sheet effects (due among other things to the deterioration of loan quality). 
In order to take into account these features, we performed a set of sensitivity analyses of 
the scenario set out in Table 3. Firstly, we investigate the consequences of alternative 
patterns of exchange rate realignment. Then, we bring into the picture a number of other 
possible adverse shocks, including a larger contractionary impact of balance sheet effects, 
an exogenous increase in the sovereign spread due to an outburst of financial panic, a 
slowing down of trade adjustment in response to exchange rate realignment, and the 





5.1 Alternative patterns of exchange rate realignment 
As mentioned in Section 3 above, the hypothesis that the realignment occurs fully within 
a year is conservative in comparison with the historical experience of European countries, 
where adjustments following the last major currency crisis (that of the EMS in 1992-93) 
were usually gradual and staged over about two years. The literature on currency crises 
distinguishes actually between “European style” crises, with very small or no 
overshooting even in the presence of relatively large realignments, and “Asian style” 
crises, with large overshooting (Cavallo et al., 2005). However, the fact that no 
overshooting occurred in Europe in the past does not imply that it could not occur in the 
future. 
Previous explanations of overshooting shed some light on the likelihood of such an 
event. Cavallo et al. (2005) relate overshooting to balance sheet effects. Depreciation of 
the exchange rate in excess of the new equilibrium value would be triggered by the fire 
sales of domestic assets needed to buy back some the country’s external debt denominated 
in foreign currency. The key variable in this respect is the level of net foreign assets 
denominated in foreign currency, which was on average around 15 percent of GDP in 
European countries, and almost twice as large in Asian countries (Cavallo et al., 2005, 
Table 1). Durand and Villemot (2016) estimate that the relevant net position of Italy 
including the Target2 liabilities of the Italian national bank at the end of 2015 was about 
30 percent of GDP, which points to the likelihood of some overshooting in case of a major 
realignment. 
Another explanation of overshooting stresses the role of financial panic (Kim and Kim, 
2007). While in a number of recent experiences, including Brexit in June 2016 (Gudgin 
et al., 2016), the election of Donald Trump in November 2016, and the Italian 
constitutional referendum in December 2016, the expected wave of financial panic did 
not materialize, an event such as the withdrawal of Italy, to the extent that it brings about 
a dissolution of the euro, as assumed in our scenarios, would be surrounded by 
considerable uncertainty, and this increases the possibility of some panic. 
Building on these considerations, we assess the sensitivity of our results by examining 
the countercyclical policies scenarios under two further pattern of nominal realignment. 
The first one mimics the historical experience of “European style” crises, by considering 





remaining 25 percent in the second year. The second pattern considers a 10 percent 
overshooting in the first year, with the exchange rate reverting to the estimated adjustment 
in the second year. The overshooting was calculated with respect to the new equilibrium 
value defined by the realignment set out in Section 3. For instance, since the misalignment 
towards the core is equal to 24 percent, the new equilibrium exchange rate is 0.76. In the 
scenarios presented in Section 4 this value is reached immediately, whereas in the 
“gradual” scenario the exchange rate drops only to 0.82 in the first year (75 percent of the 
total adjustment), and in the overshooting scenario it drops to 0.68 (exceeding by -10 
percent the new equilibrium value). The size of the overshooting was estimated by 
looking at the historical experience of countries with a comparable size of net foreign 
assets. Our sensitivity analysis considers an extreme scenario as overshooting is usually 
a short-run phenomenon, and the estimates provided in the literature usually consider 
monthly data, while our model is specified in annual data. Therefore, a 10 percent 
overshooting in annual terms actually corresponds to a much larger overshooting in 
monthly terms. 
We implement these different patterns of adjustment in two ways: first, we apply the 
alternative adjustment patterns only towards the core of the EA, then we apply them 
towards all the partner countries. The scenario where adjustment is gradual only towards 
the core corresponds to the hypothesis that monetary authorities would cooperate within 
the EA, in the presence of some turmoil in the international financial markets. On the 
contrary, the scenario in which overshooting occurs only towards the EA core 
corresponds to the case in which the dissolution of the euro causes a wave of regional 
financial contagion. The scenario in which the adjustment is gradual towards all the major 
partner countries reflects the historical experience of Italian currency crises. 
Table 4 and Figure 2 summarize the main results of the sensitivity analysis.13 The main 
stylized fact emerging from the analysis is that in the medium term the macroeconomic 
impact would not change dramatically under different patterns of adjustment. At the end 
of the simulation sample real GDP would come out in a range between 3 percent and 3.4 
percent above the baseline, against 3.2 percent in the previous scenario. Interestingly 
enough, the most growth-friendly environment is the one in which the realignment is 
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 In order to save space, in Tables 4 and 5 we report results only for some variables. The full set of results of the sensitivity 





gradual only towards the EA core, while the worst outcome occurs when the exchange 
rate overshoots only towards the EA core.  
 
[ Insert Table 4 around here ] 
 
[ Insert Figure 2 around here ] 
 
On the other hand, while some divergences exist in the short term, they do not seem to 
be dramatic. As shown in Table 4 and Figure 2, the main difference is that in the presence 
of overshooting, the response of GDP is V-shaped, with a trough in the second year, 
despite the implementation of countercyclical policies. This is mostly due to the fact that 
in the overshooting scenarios higher inflation in the first year erodes some of the 
competitiveness gains, a development reinforced in the second year when the bilateral 
exchange rate revaluates to reach its new long-run equilibrium. When the overshooting 
occurs with respect to all partners, this behaviour is even more noticeable. As mentioned 
above, these differences tend to get reabsorbed in the medium term.  
5.2 Other sensitivity analyses 
Table 5 and Figure 3 present the results of other sensitivity analyses, whose design and 
major results will be briefly discussed in this section. Firstly, we accounted for the 
occurrence of larger balance sheet effects, implemented by increasing by one standard 
error in absolute value the coefficients in Eq. (1).14 Secondly, we simulated a slower 
adjustment speed in response to the nominal realignment, implemented by reducing by 
one standard error in absolute value the impact elasticities to the real exchange rate as 
well as the coefficient of the lagged cointegrating residuals in all the trade equations. 
Thirdly, we simulated an outburst of financial panic, by assuming that there would be an 
exogenous increase in the sovereign spread equal to 200 basis points in the first year, 
implemented as an add factor in equation [25] in Table 1. Fourthly, we simulated the 
application of a retaliatory tariff on Italian products by core countries, equal to 5% for the 
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first two years of the simulation sample, implemented by increasing by 5% the variable 
RER1 in the equation of x1 (Eq. [13] in Table 1). 
The medium term outcomes, in particular in terms of real GDP, do not differ 
dramatically under different hypotheses. In the event of severe financial distress, either 
in the form of larger balance sheet effects or of a surge in the sovereign spread, real GDP 
will be only 2.6% above the baseline after five years (0.6 points lower than in the 
reference scenario). In three out of the four additional scenarios GDP decreases in the 
first year, although this decrease is statistically significant only in case of larger balance 
sheets effects and of retaliatory tariffs. Interestingly enough, under all the hypotheses 
considered higher nominal growth would bring about a decrease of public debt-to-GDP 
ratio by about 18 percentage points. 
 
[ Insert Table 5 around here ] 
 
[ Insert Figure 3 around here ] 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
This paper aims to assess the main macroeconomic consequences of the re-adoption of a 
national currency in a large EA peripheral country, taking Italy as a case study. The 
simulation outcomes are consistent with recent research. While a realignment of the 
nominal exchange rate per se would not bring about any statistically significant benefit 
in terms of growth in the medium run, it would open fiscal space. Supplemented with an 
expansionary policy stance, the realignment would contribute to a significant increase in 
output and employment, and hence to effective fiscal consolidation. If the real growth 
rates proposed by the last IMF scenario were corrected with the upward deviations in real 
GDP growth resulting from our “counterfactual policies” scenario, the Italian economy 
would recover its pre-crisis GDP level by 2020, i.e. five years before the year currently 
assumed by the IMF.15 Robustness checks show that these results hold also in case of 
extreme events such as a sizeable overshooting in the currency realignments, an event 
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that could materialize in case of a disorderly fragmentation of the single currency, as well 
as in the presence of other possible adverse shocks. 
Some concluding perspectives are in order. First, this paper should not be construed as 
an action plan for the withdrawal of Italy from the EA, nor does it advocate this event as 
a desirable outcome. A more growth-friendly environment, compliant with member 
countries’ external constraints, could be achieved by a joint fiscal effort undertaken in a 
coordinated way by all EA member countries. However, partly as a result of the 
endogenous economic divergence described in the introduction, the recent political 
developments, both in and outside the EA, have led to an increasingly confrontational 
attitude among the member countries which makes this first best scenario more and more 
unlikely. Despite the considerable systemic and political uncertainty involved in a 
breakup of the euro, it is therefore worth trying to quantify its macroeconomic 
consequences. 
Second, while taking into account some major sources of macroeconomic stress (from 
contractionary balance sheet effects to the sovereign bond yield spread), our main 
simulation considers an extremely stylized counterfactual: a once-and-for-all nominal 
realignment of the Italian national currency, which brings it back into line with its 
equilibrium value in real terms in about a year, leaving nominal exchange rates 
substantially stable thereafter. In conceptual terms, our simulation experiments therefore 
amount to analysing the effects of realignment within a system of fixed exchange rates. 
A more realistic scenario would consider the move to a different monetary system, such 
as a target zones regime. A thorough comparison of the long-run performance of different 
monetary systems would, however, exceed the scope of the present research, which 
focuses on the short- to medium-run consequences of a realignment. The L-shaped pattern 
of nominal exchange rate adjustment considered in our counterfactuals is consistent with 
quite a number of historical experiences, where large realignments were followed by 
periods of relative stability (see e.g. Burstein et al., 2002). On this basis, we believe that 
our assumption on the stability of bilateral nominal exchange rates after the realignment 
provides a reasonable approximation, underpinning the usefulness of the insights 
provided by our results.16 
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 We carried out an additional simulation in which the bilateral exchange rates between Italy and the three groups of European 





Third, contrary to some previous assessments of the consequences of a euro breakup, 
such as Belke and Verheyen’s (2013) “doomsday” scenario, the results of our simulations 
show that the short-term costs of the breakup, while non-negligible, would be 
manageable, and in the case of active policy intervention, the advantages over a five-year 
horizon would be substantial. The difference between previous analyses and our results 
reflects some fundamental changes in the macroeconomic framework, as well as some 
recent theoretical developments, which affect the evaluation of both the baseline and 
counterfactual scenarios. 
As regards changing macroeconomic conditions, since the time of Belke and 
Verheyen’s analysis quantitative easing policies have drawn the euro exchange rate much 
closer to parity with the dollar (in 2016 it has so far averaged 1.11, down from an average 
of 1.33 in 2013), while failing to reanimate inflation. This has two major consequences. 
First, it is unlikely that Italy would experience a further major depreciation against the 
dollar, reducing the likelihood of the counterfactual scenarios leading to severe 
inflationary consequences. Second, the Italian economy is currently in a deflationary 
environment that compromises both private and sovereign debt sustainability, making the 
baseline scenario look increasingly risky, and some imported inflation much more 
desirable than it appeared before. 
As for theoretical developments, Gödl and Kleinert’s (2016) analysis, implemented in 
our model, suggests that fundamental variables might play a much more significant role 
than is commonly assumed in explaining the sovereign debt spread, especially in EA 
crisis countries, where the public debt-to-GDP ratio has a large and extremely significant 
impact on the spread, while real growth has a negative impact. Easing of the public debt 
burden as a result of higher nominal growth would therefore mitigate the consequences 
of the breakup on the average cost of government debt. This result disproves the narrative 
that public finances would be threatened by an “explosion” of the interest rate spread, 
while confirming the stylized facts collected by Nitsch (2004). Furthermore, recent 
developments in the analysis of fiscal multipliers in recessions (Canzoneri et al., 2016) 
suggest that moderately expansionary policies may be a more effective way of achieving 
public debt sustainability than harsh austerity measures.  
 
simulations is that the related multipliers are not statistically different from the ones obtained without taking nominal exchange rate 





Although exit from a currency union involves further technical and political challenges, 
our results confirm the historical experience of these events summarized by Rose’s (2007) 
statement: “there are typically no sharp macroeconomic movements before, during or 
after exits”. The results also confirm, as was the case with entry into the single currency 
area, that exit from the single currency is not a panacea and considerable uncertainty 
surrounds its consequences. If the monetary union should eventually prove politically 
unsustainable, confirming Kaldor’s (1971) intuition, re-adoption of a national currency 
would only be a necessary condition for recovery and definitely not a sufficient one. 
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Table 1 – Model structure  
Demand Wages, prices, interest rates 














[2] ib = k – k-1 (1 – ) [18] ULC = W / (y/n) 
[3] ik = f( y ) [19] Pcp = f ( ULC, Pm, y – y* ) 
[4]  i ixx  [20] Pib = f ( ULC, Pm ) 
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u 1100  [30]  ibbcpp PiPcIT   
 [31]  ggb nWnWSC   
Trade [32]  uAGEYfSB ,,  
[13]  iii RERyfx ,   i =1, ..., 7 [33] gggg CInWC   
[14]  ii RERyfm ,   i =1, ..., 7 [34] GR = DT + IT + SC  









    i =1, ..., 7 [36] GB = PB – IRg  D  


































Table 1 (continued) – Model structure 
Variables  
A = total factor productivity r = long-term real interest rate 
AGE = age dependency ratio RERi = real exchange rate with respect to partner i 
cg = government final consumption  SB = social security benefits 
cp = households final consumption SC = social security contributions 
CIg = government intermediate consumption t = time trend 
D = public debt u = unemployment rate 
DT = direct taxes ULC = unit labour cost 
Ei = index of the nominal exchange rate towards 
the i-th partner area 
W = wage rate, private sector 
EPL = index of employment protection legislation Wg = wage rate, public sector 
FPR = female participation rate x = exports of goods and services 
GB = government balance xi = exports of goods and services towards partner 
i 
ib = private gross fixed capital formation y = gross domestic product, real 
ig = government gross fixed capital formation Y = gross domestic product, nominal 
ik = changes in inventories yi = real gross domestic product of partner i  
IRf = foreign interest rate Yp = self-employment and property income 
IRg = ex post interest rate on public debt y* = potential output 
IRl = long-term nominal interest rate  
IRs = short-term nominal interest rate  
IT = indirect taxes  
k = stock of physical capital, private sector Parameters 
lf = labour force α = Capital share 
m = imports of goods and services δ = Indirect tax rate 
mi = imports of goods and services from the i-th 
trade partner  
 = Rate of labour augmenting technical progress 
n = total employment i = Import share from partner i  
nb = Employment, private sector  = average social security contribution rate 
ng = Employment, public sector ς = Risk premium 
Pxi = deflator of the exports of goods and services 
of the i-th partner  
 = average direct tax rate 
Pz = deflator of variable z (z = cp, ib, ig, ik, x, m, y) ω = Scrap rate 
Notes: Lower cases indicate the corresponding real value of the variables in upper case; a dot over a variable indicates 





Table 2 – Base case scenario 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Percentage deviations from the baseline 
[1] real GDP -0.7 -1.1 -0.5 0.7 1.4 
  (0.17) (0.32) (0.51) (0.72) (0.93) 
[2] average labour productivity -1.1 -1.5 -0.9 0.3 0.9 
  (0.14) (0.27) (0.44) (0.61) (0.78) 
[3] real wage rate -1.7 -1.6 -0.3 1.3 2.3 
  (0.09) (0.20) (0.34) (0.48) (0.63) 
Absolute deviations from the baseline 
[4] unemployment rate -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) 
[5] long term interest rate 1.2 1.6 1.7 1.5 1.3 
  (0.27) (0.25) (0.15) (0.07) (0.07) 
[6] public debt-to-GDP ratio -5.2 -8.2 -10.5 -12.2 -13.0 
  (0.23) (0.34) (0.49) (0.70) (0.91) 
[7] public deficit-to-GDP ratio -0.2 0.0 0.7 1.1 0.9 
  (0.09) (0.15) (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) 
[8] trade balance-to-GDP ratio 1.6 1.9 1.3 0.7 0.6 
  (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.13) (0.17) 
Absolute deviations between the counterfactual and baseline growth rates 
[9] private consumption -0.9 0.0 1.7 2.2 1.0 
  (0.15) (0.19) (0.20) (0.25) (0.29) 
[10] private investment 1.0 0.6 0.9 1.3 0.1 
  (0.39) (0.29) (0.32) (0.42) (0.40) 
[11] exports 4.1 -1.3 0.9 1.8 0.9 
  (0.30) (0.27) (0.28) (0.32) (0.31) 
[12] imports -6.0 0.5 3.7 3.8 1.0 
  (0.45) (0.45) (0.52) (0.51) (0.49) 
[13] real GDP -0.7 -0.4 0.6 1.2 0.7 
  (0.17) (0.16) (0.19) (0.21) (0.21) 
[14] nominal GDP 3.7 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.2 
  (0.14) (0.12) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) 
[15] consumption price index 2.9 2.6 2.1 1.4 0.8 
  (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) 
Notes: deviations are estimated as sample average of the 10,000 replications of the stochastic simulation experiment; 





Table 3 – Countercyclical policy scenario 
  1 2 3 4 5 
 Percentage deviations from the baseline 
[1] real GDP 0.3 0.4 1.2 2.5 3.2 
  (0.15) (0.32) (0.52) (0.76) (1.01) 
[2] average labour productivity -0.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.5 1.0 
  (0.13) (0.26) (0.44) (0.63) (0.84) 
[3] real wage rate -1.6 -1.1 0.6 2.4 3.6 
  (0.08) (0.21) (0.38) (0.54) (0.71) 
 Absolute deviations from the baseline 
[4] unemployment rate -0.7 -1.1 -1.4 -1.7 -1.8 
  (0.02) (0.04) (0.06) (0.08) (0.10) 
[5] long term interest rate 1.2 1.8 2.1 2.1 1.9 
  (0.26) (0.24) (0.15) (0.08) (0.07) 
[6] public debt-to-GDP ratio -7.0 -11.4 -15.0 -17.8 -19.6 
  (0.31) (0.49) (0.72) (1.03) (1.35) 
[7] public deficit-to-GDP ratio 0.0 0.0 0.6 1.0 0.8 
  (0.09) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) 
[8] trade balance-to-GDP ratio 0.9 1.1 0.5 -0.1 -0.3 
  (0.08) (0.07) (0.10) (0.14) (0.18) 
 Absolute deviations between the counterfactual and baseline growth rates 
[9] private consumption -0.2 0.6 1.9 2.3 1.2 
  (0.18) (0.24) (0.25) (0.29) (0.36) 
[10] private investment 3.5 1.8 1.4 1.3 0.0 
  (0.36) (0.34) (0.50) (0.65) (0.69) 
[11] exports 4.7 -1.2 0.8 1.6 0.8 
  (0.30) (0.29) (0.30) (0.33) (0.34) 
[12] imports -2.9 1.0 3.8 3.7 1.1 
  (0.45) (0.44) (0.46) (0.49) (0.56) 
[13] real GDP 0.3 0.1 0.8 1.3 0.7 
  (0.15) (0.16) (0.21) (0.23) (0.24) 
[14] nominal GDP 5.2 3.3 3.1 2.7 1.8 
  (0.15) (0.12) (0.11) (0.13) (0.14) 
[15] consumption price index 3.7 3.3 2.8 2.1 1.4 
  (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) 
Notes: deviations are estimated as sample average of the 10,000 replications of the stochastic simulation experiment; 





Table 4 – Alternative patterns of nominal exchange rate realignment 
  1 2 3 4 5 
 Gradual adjustment towards the core 
[1] real GDP 0.2 0.6 1.4 2.6 3.4 
  (0.14) (0.29) (0.49) (0.72) (0.97) 
[2] % change in consumption price index 3.1 3.2 2.8 2.1 1.4 
  (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) 
[3] real wage rate -1.4 -1.0 0.3 2.0 3.2 
  (0.08) (0.20) (0.36) (0.51) (0.68) 
[4] public debt-to-GDP ratio -5.7 -10.2 -14.2 -17.3 -19.4 
  (0.26) (0.47) (0.71) (1.01) (1.33) 
[5] trade balance-to-GDP ratio 0.6 0.7 0.4 -0.1 -0.2 
  (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.13) (0.17) 
 Overshooting towards the core 
[6] real GDP 0.7 -0.2 0.8 2.2 3.0 
  (0.21) (0.39) (0.63) (0.89) (1.15) 
[7] % change in consumption price index 4.9 3.5 2.8 2.0 1.3 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) 
[8] real wage rate -2.0 -1.1 1.1 3.2 4.5 
  (0.11) (0.26) (0.44) (0.61) (0.81) 
[9] public debt-to-GDP ratio -9.9 -14.1 -16.9 -19.2 -20.2 
  (0.44) (0.56) (0.78) (1.10) (1.41) 
[10] trade balance-to-GDP ratio 1.7 1.9 0.7 -0.2 -0.4 
  (0.10) (0.10) (0.13) (0.17) (0.20) 
 Gradual adjustment towards all partners 
[11] real GDP -0.2 0.7 1.7 2.7 3.1 
  (0.15) (0.31) (0.52) (0.77) (1.04) 
[12] % change in consumption price index 2.4 2.6 2.5 2.1 1.6 
  (0.04) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) 
[13] real wage rate -1.2 -0.2 1.6 3.5 4.8 
  (0.08) (0.20) (0.35) (0.51) (0.69) 
[14] public debt-to-GDP ratio -5.7 -9.7 -13.4 -16.4 -18.3 
  (0.21) (0.39) (0.63) (0.95) (1.29) 
[15] trade balance-to-GDP ratio 1.1 1.0 0.6 0.1 0.0 
  (0.07) (0.08) (0.12) (0.16) (0.20) 
 Overshooting towards all partners 
[16] real GDP 1.0 -0.4 0.7 2.4 3.3 
  (0.21) (0.40) (0.63) (0.90) (1.17) 
[17] % change in consumption price index 5.3 3.4 2.6 1.9 1.1 
  (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) 
[18] real wage rate -2.0 -1.4 0.8 3.1 4.5 
  (0.11) (0.27) (0.44) (0.61) (0.80) 
[19] public debt-to-GDP ratio -10.0 -14.5 -17.1 -19.3 -20.4 
  (0.48) (0.58) (0.79) (1.10) (1.42) 
[20] trade balance-to-GDP ratio 1.4 2.0 0.7 -0.3 -0.4 
  (0.12) (0.11) (0.13) (0.17) (0.21) 
Notes: real GDP and real wage are expressed as percentage deviations from the baseline; change in consumption price 
index, public debt-to-GDP ratio and trade balance-to-GDP ratio are expressed as absolute deviations from the baseline; 
deviations are estimated as sample average of the 10,000 replications of the stochastic simulation experiment; bootstrap 





Table 5 – Other sensitivity analyses 
  1 2 3 4 5 
 Larger balance sheet effects 
[1] real GDP -0.8 -0.8 0.3 1.8 2.6 
  (0.18) (0.35) (0.58) (0.82) (1.07) 
[2] % change in consumption price index 3.9 3.5 3.0 2.3 1.5 
  (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) 
[3] real wage rate -2.2 -1.5 0.5 2.7 4.1 
  (0.10) (0.23) (0.40) (0.57) (0.75) 
[4] public debt-to-GDP ratio -7.4 -11.4 -14.6 -17.2 -18.5 
  (0.30) (0.46) (0.70) (1.03) (1.36) 
[5] trade balance-to-GDP ratio 1.6 1.5 0.6 -0.2 -0.3 
  (0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.16) (0.19) 
 Slower trade response 
[6] real GDP -0.1 0.1 1.0 2.2 2.9 
  (0.14) (0.29) (0.48) (0.69) (0.92) 
[7] % change in consumption price index 3.7 3.3 2.7 2.0 1.3 
  (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) 
[8] real wage rate -1.8 -1.3 0.3 2.1 3.2 
  (0.08) (0.20) (0.36) (0.51) (0.68) 
[9] public debt-to-GDP ratio -6.5 -10.9 -14.4 -17.2 -18.8 
  (0.30) (0.46) (0.67) (0.95) (1.23) 
[10] trade balance-to-GDP ratio 0.8 1.0 0.4 -0.2 -0.3 
  (0.09) (0.07) (0.10) (0.14) (0.18) 
 Financial panic 
[11] real GDP 0.4 0.3 0.9 1.9 2.6 
  (0.16) (0.31) (0.50) (0.72) (0.96) 
[12] % change in consumption price index 3.5 3.2 2.8 2.2 1.4 
  (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) 
[13] real wage rate -1.5 -1.0 0.4 2.0 3.1 
  (0.09) (0.21) (0.36) (0.51) (0.68) 
[14] public debt-to-GDP ratio -6.4 -10.6 -13.9 -16.6 -18.2 
  (0.30) (0.47) (0.67) (0.95) (1.24) 
[15] trade balance-to-GDP ratio 0.9 1.1 0.7 0.2 -0.0 
  (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.13) (0.17) 
 Retaliatory tariffs 
[16] real GDP -0.3 -0.5 0.7 2.2 3.1 
  (0.14) (0.29) (0.50) (0.74) (0.98) 
[17] % change in consumption price index 3.8 3.3 2.7 2.0 1.3 
  (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) 
[18] real wage rate -1.9 -1.6 0.1 2.0 3.3 
  (0.08) (0.20) (0.36) (0.52) (0.69) 
[19] public debt-to-GDP ratio -6.5 -10.4 -13.8 -16.7 -18.4 
  (0.28) (0.42) (0.66) (0.99) (1.32) 
[20] trade balance-to-GDP ratio 0.8 0.9 0.4 -0.2 -0.3 
  (0.08) (0.07) (0.10) (0.14) (0.18) 
Notes: real GDP and real wage are expressed as percentage deviations from the baseline; change in consumption price 
index, public debt-to-GDP ratio and trade balance-to-GDP ratio are expressed as absolute deviations from the baseline; 
deviations are estimated as sample average of the 10,000 replications of the stochastic simulation experiment; bootstrap 








Figure 1 – Average percentage deviation of real GDP (GDPV) and total employment (ET), and 
absolute deviations of the debt-to-GDP ratio, trade balance-to-GDP ratio, long-term interest rate, 
and consumer price inflation (GGFLQ, TBQ, IRL and PCP) with respect to the baseline under 







Figure 2 – Percentage deviation of real GDP from the baseline in the sensitivity analyses under 
alternative adjustment patterns of the nominal exchange rates. The graphs in the first column show 
the consequences of a gradual adjustment occurring over two years, while the second column 
considers an adjustment with overshooting. In the first row these patterns apply to all partner 
countries, in the second one only to the euro area core countries. 
 
 
Figure 3 – Percentage deviation of real GDP from the baseline in the sensitivity analyses. The 





Appendix: the estimated long-run equationsa 
1. Consumption function 
ln(cp) = -1.21(3.48) + 0.06  (t>1994)(2.65) +  1.01  ln[ (Y – DT)/Pcp] (32.06) + 2.07  FPR(5.18) 
R2 = 0.99; CRADF = -2.67; GH = -5.51*** 
2. Changes in inventories 
ik = -33682.62(12.12) – 13855.23  (t>1976)(6.40) + 0.04  y(9.62) 
R2 = 0.75; F = 31.55*** 
3. Production function 
ln(y*/n) = 0.82(1.21) + [0.46(2.67) + 0.07  (t>1971)(3.92) + 0.12  (t>1997)(4.55)]  ln(k/n) 
+ [0.04(3.70) - 0.03  (t>1971)(4.18) - 0.01  (t>1997)(4.39) – 0.001  (t>2008) (6.91)]  t 
R2 = 0.99; CRADF = -2.91; GH = -4.10; ADF* = -5.83* 
4. Labour demandb 
ln(nb) – ln(y) +   ln[(1-)/] – ln(W/Pib) = -3.54(627.23) - 0.24  (t>1971)(9.60) 
- 0.78  (t>1997)(23.11) + [-0.029(25.81) + 0.015  (t>1971)(9.29) - 0.021  (t>1997)(20.88)]  t 
R2 = 0.99 
5. Capital accumulationc 
k = 0.05(16.60) - 0.02  (t>1971)(6.31) - 0.02  (t>1997)(11.13) + [0.16  (t>1971)(9.58) 










R2 = 0.89 
6. Exports towards euro area core 
ln(x1) = -17.24(18.76) + 1.84  ln(y1)(31.42) – [0.57(2.89) + 0.69(t>1986)(4.59)]  ln(RER1) 
R2 = 0.99; CRADF = -2.56; GH = -5.53** 
 
a
 When the variables were all integrated of order one, the existence of a long-run relation was first tested using the cointegrating regression 
augmented Dickey-Fuller (CRADF) test (Engle and Granger, 1987); if this test failed to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration, we performed 
the Gregory and Hansen (1996) test (GH), which allows for one parameters shift at unknown dates; if even the GH test failed to reject, we applied 
Hatemi J (2008) cointegration test (ADF*), which allows for two parameters shifts. The equations were specified accordingly, by modelling the 
shifts in parameters through the dummy (t > t0), which takes value zero from the beginning of the sample to year t0, and value one onwards. Absolute 
values of t-statistics for the individual parameters are in parentheses. As a rule, insignificant parameters shifts were dropped from the final equation. 
In two cases in which the variables involved might not be of the same order of integration (Eq. 2 and 25), we used the Pesaran et al. (2001) ARDL 
estimator, which allows for the estimation of long-run relations among variables of different order of integration, and reported the statistics of the 
bounds test for the null hypothesis of no long-run relationship. One, two or three asterisks indicate a statistic significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
significance level respectively. 
b
 The parameter  in the left-hand side of the conditional labour demand equation is the estimate of the capital share obtained from equation 3, 
equal to 0.46 from 1960 to 1971, 0.53 from 1972 to 1997, 0.64 from 1998 onwards. The equation was estimated by OLS conditional on the structural 
breaks found in the underlying production function (Eq. 3). 
c






7. Exports towards euro area periphery 
ln(x2) = -16.79(25.81) – 12.25  (t>1985)(10.42) + 1.98  (t>1999)(17.78) + [1.86(38.90) 
+ 0.92  (t>1985) (10.93)]  ln(y2) – [0.43(2.80) + 1.48(t>1985)(5.35)]  ln(RER2) 
R2 = 0.99; CRADF = -0.68; GH = -4.51; ADF* = -5.53** 
8. Exports towards the USA 
ln(x3) = -47.65(7.82) + 0.30  (t>1982)(4.47) + 3.69  ln(y3)(9.04) –1.03  ln(RER3)(8.05) – 0.06  t(5.0) 
R2 = 0.97; CRADF = -2.06; GH = -5.12* 
9. Exports towards other European Union countries 
ln(x4) = -17.11(20.78) + 1.85  ln(y4)(34.07) –1.52  ln(RER4)(3.54) 
R2 = 0.98; CRADF = -3.81* 
10. Exports towards OPEC countries 
ln(x5) = 6.10(3.83) + 0.26  ln(y5)(2.31) – 0.67  ln(RER5)(7.08) 
R2 = 0.85; CRADF = -4.25** 
11. Exports towards the BRIC countries 
ln(x6) = -11.09(15.50) - 0.27  (t>1977)(2.74) + 1.34  ln(y6)(26.49) –1.20  ln(RER6)  (t>1993)(2.49) 
R2 = 0.95; CRADF = -2.06; GH = -5.18** 
12. Exports towards the rest of the world 
ln(x7) = -14.49(9.59) + 0.44  (t>1993)(9.65) + 1.55  ln(y7)(16.58) –0.47  ln(RER7)(2.64) 
R2 = 0.98; CRADF = -2.06; GH = -5.48*** 
13. Imports from the euro area core 
ln(m1) = -18.35(13.67) - 0.21  (t>1978)(3.04) + 2.11  ln(y)(21.60) + 1.03  ln(RER1)(9.39) 
R2 = 0.99; CRADF = -2.78; GH = -5.51*** 
14. Imports from the euro area periphery 
ln(m2) = -35.97(24.19) + 0.17  (t>1987)(3.23) + 0.23  (t>1994)(5.82)  + 3.17  ln(y)(29.49) 
+ 1.97  ln(RER2)(9.82) 
R2 = 0.99; CRADF = -2.54; GH = -5.49*** 
15. Imports from the USA 
ln(m3) = -10.38(4.95) - 0.31  (t>1981)(5.61) + 1.40  ln(y)(9.44) + 0.39  ln(RER3)(3.08) 
R2 = 0.94; CRADF = -3.08; GH = -4.76* 
16. Imports from other European Union countries 
ln(m4) = -16.09(18.12) + 0.23  (t>1984)(6.67) + 1.82  ln(y)(28.49) - 0.45  ln(RER4)(3.03) 





17. Imports from OPEC countries 
ln(m5) = 12.69(9.61) - 0.17  ln(y)(1.84) + 0.16  ln(RER5)(4.01) 
R2 = 0.49; CRADF = -5.20*** 
18. Imports from the BRIC countries 
ln(m6) = -5.34(0.75) - 1.85  (t>1999)(3.03) + 0.93  ln(y)(1.77) + 0.74  ln(RER6)(3.18) 
+ [0.04(3.22) + 0.05(3.37)  (t>1999)]  t 
R2 = 0.99; CRADF = -5.49* 
19. Imports from the rest of the world 
ln(m7) = -11.52(4.61) - 0.43  (t>1985)(5.73) + 0.33  (t>1998)(5.59) + 1.55  ln(y)(8.33) 
+ 1.19  ln(RER7)(5.04) + 0.01  t(3.25) 
R2 = 0.99; CRADF = -1.17; GH = -3.78; ADF* = -5.10 
20. Wage rate in the private sectord 
ln(W/Pcp) -  ln(y/n) – ln(1-) = -3.73(30.10) + 0.50  (t>1971)(17.00) - 0.49  (t>1997)(5.84)  
+ 0.07(2.10)  EPL + [0.008(3.25) – 0.02  (t>1971)(6.78) + 0.02  (t>1997)(8.94)]  t 
R2 = 0.96 
21. Deflator, private consumption 
ln(Pcp) = -0.58(20.13) + 0.42  (t>1978)(13.72) + [0.29(13.12) - 0.14  (t>1978)(1.58)]  ln(Pm) 
+ [0.59(33.07) + 0.37  (t>1978)(5.83) – 0.27  (t>1998)(9.49)]  ln(ULC) 
R2 = 0.99; CRADF = -2.36; GH = -4.10; ADF* = -6.35* 
22. Deflator, private gross fixed capital formation 
ln(Pib) = -0.18(8.76) + 0.02  (t>1986)(1.01) + [0.36(11.19) - 0.09  (t>1986)(9.39)]  ln(Pm) 
+ 0.66  ln(ULC)(18.69) 
R2 = 0.99; CRADF = -1.14; GH = -5.70** 
23. Deflator, public gross fixed capital formation 
ln(Pig) = -0.16(8.80) + 0.17  (t>1977)(9.30) + [1.00(129.95) + 0.08  (t>1977)(8.83)]  ln(Pib) 
R2 = 0.99; CRADF = -2.30; GH = -5.44** 
24. Deflator, exports 
ln(Px) = -0.36(16.75) + 0.39  (t>1978)(17.04) - 0.03  (t>1997)(3.15) + [0.72(26.53) 
- 0.20  (t>1978)(4.53)]  ln(Pm) + [0.09(3.43) + 0.39  (t>1978)(10.58) – 0.30  (t>1997)(8.48)]  
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R2 = 0.99; CRADF = -2.07; GH= -3.45; ADF* = -6.18 
25. Short-term interest rate 
IRs = -0.54(0.26) + 1.44(15.20)  cpP
 + 1.10  ( y – y* )(2.34) 
R2 = 0.83; F = 23.49*** 
26. Ex-post interest rate on public debt 
IRg = 0.98(3.12) + 1.85  (t >1983)(2.72) + [0.43(9.96) + 0.17  (t>1983)(1.70) )  [( IRs + IRl )/2 ] 
R2 = 0.92; CRADF = -2.56; GH = -4.61** 
27. Social security benefits 
ln(SB) = -3.45(11.91) + 0.09  (t >2004)(2.87) + 1.10  Y(96.63) + 0.72  AGE(2.03) + 1.75  u(4.51) 
R2 = 0.99; CRADF = -3.43; GH = -5.63** 
 
